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Why American engineers aren't unionized: A comparative 
perspective 
PETER MEIKSINSa and CHRIS SMITHb 
"Cleveland State University; bAston University 
The decline of organized labor in the United States has stimulated a 
new interest in comparative research. Explanations of the prolonged 
stagnation and contraction of the American labor movement that focus 
on the United States alone run the risk of assuming that the American 
case is "normal," and that the decline of organized labor is a structural 
inevitability of advanced capitalism. By broadening their scope to 
include other industrialized countries with similar political economies 
and very different labor histories, students of the labor movement will 
be better able to identify what is truly distinctive in the American case, 
and whether it is its distinctiveness or its typicality that accounts for the 
apparent demise of the American labor movement. 
One of the phenomena comparative labor studies reveal is that labor 
unions in Canada and Western Europe have been much more success-
ful than their American counterparts in organizing employees outside 
of the traditional strongholds of industrial workers and public 
employees. While this alone may not explain the decline of the Amer-
ican labor movement, 1 it certainly has been a factor preventing Amer-
ican unions from growing in the post-war period. Thus, one key task 
for students of American organized labor is to account for its relative 
failure, when compared to its counterparts in other industrialized 
countries, to organize "new" constituencies. 
Professional and technical workers are among the most important 
"new" constituencies in question. The changing political economy of 
post-World War II industrial capitalism has been characterized by the 
rapid growth of the high-technology sector and the expansion of pro-
fessional and technical employment, both within this sector and in 
older, more established industries. In the United States, at least, such 
workers have been seen as difficult or impossible to organize, although 
there has been considerable disagreement as to why this is the case.2 
In this article, we assess whether the American case is typical through a 
comparative analysis of the unionization of professional engineers in 
the United States and Great Britain. These two cases present a partic-
ularly useful and sharp contrast: in the United States, there are virtually 
no unionized professional engineers, while, in Great Britain, engineers' 
unions are widespread and have grown significantly in recent decades. 
Thus, a comparison of the two should provide insight into whether the 
failure of engineering unionism in the United States is inherent in the 
character of advanced industrial capitalism or whether it is due to the 
peculiarities of the American political economy. 
Two important issues emerge from a review of the major analyses of 
professional engineers' unions. First, it has been argued by many, par-
ticularly on the American side, that professionalism and unionism are 
incompatible.3 Professional associations have been identified as status 
bodies, concerned to ensure the reproduction of labor supply, while 
trade unions have been identified with wider political or class-based 
interests, alongside narrower economic aims which professional asso-
ciations supposedly transcend. This view has been widely criticized,4 
but elements of it remain in the literature on professional engineers. 
One of our objectives in this article is to evaluate the impact of profes-
sional ideologies and organizational forms on the development of 
unions among engineers. Our conclusion is that professionalism has 
been a factor in the history of engineering unionism. However, its role 
has been far more complex and contingent than the "incompatibility 
thesis" can admit. 
A second, more subtle, theme in the literature on professional engi-
neers and unionism is that professional unions are "different." While 
acknowledging the reality that professional and union forms can be 
reconciled, some observers suggest that professional unions resemble 
only superficially their blue-collar counterparts and that, in certain 
ways, they represent an attempt to deny that professional workers 
belong to the larger labor movement.5 In this article, we also consider 
whether professional engineers' unions are "different" and shed some 
light on why. Our comparative analysis yields considerable evidence in 
support of the view that they are. However, we argue that there is also 
evidence that these differences are not inevitable and may erode under 
specific historical circumstances. 
Overall, we propose what could be called a "structural contingency" 
theory of engineers' unionism in the United States and Great Britain. 
That is, we reject both the "simple" view that the differences between 
the two cases can be explained by simply saying that all societies are 
different and the alternate "simple" view which suggests that contingent 
or historical factors are irrelevant to the evolution of the labor move-
ment. Instead, we contend that there are structural forces within all 
industrial capitalist societies which create pressures towards unioniza-
tion among organizational professionals such as engineers. However, 
the outcome of these pressures, whether or not they are translated into 
viable engineers' unions, is to a considerable extent dependent upon 
the specific conditions in different national contexts. 
Professionalism and engineers' unionism 
As noted earlier, traditional explanations of low rates of unionization 
among professionals have tended to focus on the nature of profession-
alism itself. Professional ideology and professional forms of organiza-
tion are seen as antithetical to unionism; those occupations which de-
fine themselves as "professional" eschew unionism as incompatible 
with their ethical principles, social status, and employment conditions. 
This kind of argument has been most persuasive for the "classical" pro-
fessions, such as medicine and the law. Although the situation has 
changed somewhat in recent years, rates of self-employment have tra-
ditionally been quite high in such occupations. Inasmuch as unionism 
concentrates on negotiating the terms and conditions of employment, 
rather than defending self-employment and autonomy, it should not 
surprise us that doctors and lawyers have tended to see unions as in-
appropriate. Moreover, as Terence Johnson has noted, the fact that 
practitioners of medicine and the law have not, by and large, been 
employees of large profit-making organizations or public bureaucracies 
makes professionalism a viable form of occupational organization for 
them.6 That is, doctors and lawyers have been able to dictate to con-
sumers who may provide health care or legal services, to insist on and 
protect their freedom from external control - in Andrew Abbott's 
terms, they have been able to define and to defend a "jurisdiction." 7 
Faced with a mass of disorganized, relatively weak consumers (not a 
powerful, organizational employer), doctors and lawyers have found 
professional organization to be a real alternative to unionism. 
Once one moves beyond the "classical" professions, however, the situa-
tion changes. As Johnson points out, organizational employment is the 
norm for many of the occupations that are called, or call themselves, 
professions. For practitioners of these occupations, the professional 
defense of autonomy, self-employment, and professional independence 
has little meaning. On the contrary, as employees of large organiza-
tions, albeit relatively privileged ones, they experience many of the 
same pressures which historically have encouraged unionization in sub-
ordinate occupations - i.e., the need to bargain with powerful 
employers over the terms and conditions of labor. While the propo-
nents of the thesis that professionals are being proletarianized may 
overstate the case, 8 it remains clear that unionism is less problematic 
for these "new" professions, to use Larson's term. And there exists an 
extensive literature on unions in occupations such as teaching,9 which 
demonstrates both the possibility and the fact that "professional" occu-
pations can pursue their goals through unions. 
A "new" profession 
There is no doubt that engineering is an example of what Larson calls 
the "new" professions. In both the United States and Great Britain, 
engineers experienced organizational employment at early stages in the 
development of the profession; as a result, one finds relatively little 
emphasis on self-employment and professional independence within 
engineering. 
This is reflected in the form and ideology of both British and American 
engineering associations. In neither case does one find engineers 
endorsing the "medical model" of professionalism, with its emphasis on 
self-employment and professional independence. On the contrary, 
American engineers have traditionally rejected the idea of mandatory 
licensing for engineers as a method of creating professional control 
over engineering work. Indeed, representatives of the major profes-
sional associations have openly attacked this idea and have actively 
opposed legislation which would have required engineering licensing. 10 
Similarly, although the "school culture" triumphed quite early in 
American engineering, so that the normal route into the profession is 
through formal engineering education, 11 there has been real reluctance 
to make this into a hard and fast principle. It remains the case even now 
that a minority of engineers lack formal engineering credentials. 12 
This is even more true for the British case, where one of the more nota-
ble features of engineering has been its strong links to a craft tradi-
tionP Until fairly recently, formal credentials played a relatively weak 
role in the British engineering profession. Indeed, a very common route 
into engineering was from the shop floor; skilled workers could aspire 
to technical occupations, which were not "closed" to those who lacked 
university training. Moreover, even in recent years when the emphasis 
on university training as a prerequisite for engineering has increased, 
traditional recruitment patterns have not entirely disappeared. 
Although there has been an important trend toward strong professional 
credentialism in upper technical occupations, which has weakened the 
craft tradition there, it remains the case that engineering is not defined 
by engineers or their associations as a closed caste. 
The engineering associations in Britain and the United States, thus, 
have not been mechanisms for occupational control. In both Britain 
and the United States, engineering professional associations have been 
relatively weak, and their impact on engineering has been markedly 
less than was the impact of the AMA on medicine. In both countries, 
engineering associations are fragmented, with different engineering 
specialties having their own professional societies. The bewildering 
alphabet soup of professional associations that this produces, and the 
lack of an overall, unified engineering organization, has been held part-
ly responsible in both countries for the profession's relative lack of 
influence over social policy and over employees. 14 
The leadership of the professional societies in both countries is dom-
inated by engineers with strong ties to the major private sector 
employers of engineers. These strong ties with business help to explain 
the typical conservatism on economic questions of professional engi-
neering bodies. Reflecting this relative conservatism, both British and 
American engineering societies define themselves primarily as "learned 
societies." They see their role as involving the promulgation of profes-
sional knowledge and, when necessary, representing engineering opin-
ion in public and private debates over technical issues. Neither British 
nor American engineering societies have exhibited much willingness to 
become active political advocates on major social issues or to represent 
engineers in disputes over material issues with government or private 
sector employers ::>f engineers. Rates of participation by rank-and-file 
engineers in engmeering Sf'~ieties are generally low in both countries, 
although it is probably true that rates of membership in the societies 
are somewhat higher in the United States. In the United States, surveys 
of engineers have found that there is relatively little emphasis on publi-
cation and participation in professional associations as measures of 
professional status or success. Perrucci estimated that as many as one 
third of American engineers belong to no professional associations at 
all (including local or regional ones).15 For the British case, Whalley's 
case studies found that "many of the younger engineers in particular 
regarded the institutions as antiquated organizations, with little to offer 
the practicing engineer. They seemed irrelevant." Membership was 
generally viewed by the older engineers as "an instrumental device to 
get a job." 16 Active participation in the institutes was non-existent. All 
in all, professional engineering organizations in both the United States 
and Great Britain are relatively weak and do not correspond to the 
"medical model" of the professional project. 
One cannot help but be struck by the similarity of British and Amer-
ican professional organization. In both cases, the "classical" profes-
sional project, which we have argued poses the greatest obstacle to 
unionism, was a non-starter. Both are examples of "new" professions in 
which the pressures encouraging unionism are significantly stronger. 
Yet, British engineers unionized while American engineers did not. 
Professionalism, status, and unionism 
Does this mean that professionalism had nothing to do with the evolu-
tion of engineering unionism in the United States and Great Britain? 
We think not. However, to understand its historical role, we need to 
take a more nuanced look at professional rhetoric and ideology. 
Although this may not provide us with a complete explanation for the 
failure of engineering unions in the United States and their success in 
Great Britain, it helps us to focus more clearly on the questions which 
need to be answered. 
First, let us recall that engineering is a "new" profession. According to 
Larson, the professional project in such occupations focuses not on a 
combination of independence and status, but more or less exclusively 
on the latterP And there has indeed been a deep concern with status 
issues in both British and American engineering. 
Perhaps the most important manifestation of engineers' concern with 
status has been their preoccupation with their relationship with non-
professional technical workers. The question of professional bound-
aries has, in fact, been central to the history of engineering unionism in 
both the United States and Great Britain. However, while engineers in 
both countries have shown similar concern for professional bound-
aries, this has been expressed in dramatically different ways. In the 
British case it was expressed within a union context, while in the Unit-
ed States it helped to undermine the emergence of unionism. 
Historians have argued that engineers' relationship to non-professional 
technicians was the Achilles heel of engineering unionism in the United 
States. When professional engineers began to experiment with union 
organization, they were confronted with the question of whether or not 
to include technical workers in their unions. Fearing the loss of profes-
sional status for engineers that the inclusion of technicians implied, 
many engineers argued for their exclusion. This produced significant 
levels of conflict within engineers' unions, and contributed, ultimately, 
to their collapse. 18 
This account of the demise of American engineering unionism is true 
enough at one level. An analysis of the rise and fall of engineers' unions 
in the period between 1935 and 1950 shows clearly the importance of 
"the boundary question." Thus, right at the start, the initial impetus to 
the formation of engineers' unions was, to some extent, the fear of 
inclusion in industrial unions of non-professional workers. The passage 
of the National Labor Relations Act encouraged industrial unions such 
as the United Auto Workers to mount major organizing drives in many 
American industries. 19 These organizing drives often sought to include 
a wide variety of employees, including engineers, as part of the new 
bargaining unit. Since engineers would constitute a distinct minority 
within any industrial union, and since there was concern that involve-
ment with blue-collar unions would produce a decline in the engineers' 
status, engineers began, with the encouragement of their professional 
societies, to form separate engineers' unions as a way of preventing 
their subsumption into the industrial labor movement. 
This concern proved rather unnecessary. The National Labor Relations 
Board generally refused to include engineers in production workers' 
bargaining units and, in any case, the Taft-Hartley Act (1947) included 
provisions, promoted by the engineering societies, which prevented the 
forced inclusion of professionals in non-professional unions. 20 Never-
theless, engineers' unions survived for at least another decade, indicat-
ing that American engineers could accept certain kinds of unionism 
and had found that this type oforganization met some of their needs. 
Most observers concluded that engineers wanted a form of collective 
organization that would defend them materially but which was not 
linked to the larger labor movement.21 
Still, the "boundary question" continued to dog the union movement 
ahd was crucial to its eventual decline. Many of the engineering and 
technical unions that survived in the 1950s became embroiled in bitter 
disputes over the inclusion of technicians. Some argued for their inclu-
sion, on the grounds that greater numbers led to greater strength and 
that it made sense to include all technical workers in a single bargaining 
unit. Others did not wish to be associated with technicians, fearing that 
they would be treated as technicians by employers and the general 
public. Many unions eventually split over this kind of issue. 
Most notably, the Engineers and Scientists of America (ESA), founded 
in 1952 in an attempt to provide a national federation for professional 
engineers and scientists, fell apart over such status questions. In 19 56 a 
series of bitter disputes erupted, initially over affiliation to the newly 
merged AFL-CIO. Although most ESA affiliates rejected this, a few 
wished to join. Several eventually left the ESA, splitting the federation 
and, in at least one case, causing the decertification of the local union. 
Disagreement also arose over the question of including non-profes-
sional technicians in engineering bargaining units as well as over tactics 
(some affiliates wished to emphasize lobbying rather than collective 
bargaining). The ESA eventually split in 1957, and most of its member 
unions fell into decline. 22 This and similar splits weakened the unions 
dramatically and, in many cases, augured their demise. 
In short, there is no doubt that the "boundary question" was at the 
heart of the decline of American engineers' unions. Comparison with 
the British case indicates that British engineers have developed similar 
concerns about the boundary between themselves and non-profes-
sional workers. Clegg has noted that, in the confused pattern of trade 
union structure in Britain, white-collar workers' preference to join 
white-collar organizations is one of the only safe facts. 23 Yet even this 
structural given began to erode in the 1980s- up until this time it was 
true that the first experience of unionism for technical workers, and 
white-collar labor in general, was through their own exclusive organiza-
tions. Notably, it has proved possible to accommodate these status con-
cerns within the union movement, allowing the technical unions to 
survive and grow. These different outcomes suggest that a concern with 
status and exclusivity is not incompatible with uqionism. Depending on 
the larger context in which such concerns are expressed, as well as the 
timing of the emergence of the issue, engineers' sense of professional 
status can be accommodated by the union movement. 
Craft exclusiveness was the dominant form of unionism for technical 
workers in Britain well into the 1960s. There were no general white-
collar unions until the 1960s, and expansion away from a particular 
core occupation (for example the "draughtsmen's union" deciding to 
recruit planning engineers and "other technicians") was undertaken 
somewhat reluctantly, but with determination.24 General manual 
unions did establish white-collar sections, particularly for clerical staff, 
but these have not proven to be durable forms and have declined and 
disappeared in recent years. Craft unions, too, such as the Amalgam-
ated Engineering Union (AEU) or the Electrician's Trade Union 
(ETU) did strive to include foremen, technicians and even professional 
engineers within their ranks, but met with limited success in competi-
tion with exclusive white-collar unions.25 
The shape of British technical unionism began to change in the late 
1960s, in the context of a major change in the pattern of engineering 
training. In the 1960s, British engineers started to be produced through 
the universities, not through part-time courses in technical colleges and 
"premium" apprenticeships, and a "graduate barrier" began to emerge 
within the broad technical engineering labor process. This was a new 
phenomenon in Britain. Engineers were being "professionalized" and 
not socialized through the craft traditions, where acquiring a union 
card and experience had been part of the general apprenticeship. "Pro-
fessionalization" opened new opportunities and challenges for collec-
tive organization, and there have been several drives to generate organ-
izational forms adapted to new patterns of occupational closure. These 
have not, however, taken place within a political or historical vacuum, 
and competition for newly professionalized engineers has been divided 
between an evolving but entrenched union movement and new exclu-
sive professional bodies. 
Established unions, like DATA (the Draughtsmen's and Allied Techni-
cians' Association), launched membership drives in the late 1960s 
aimed at the professional engineer. Initially, engineers were incorpo-
rated as a standard category of membership with no sectional auton-
omy. This was only partially successful, and the union policy towards 
accommodating engineers has been through several changes, until by 
the late 1970s granting limited autonomy within the union was decided 
to be the best method of recruiting these groups. The union followed 
the pattern of sectionalism developed by another technical union, 
ASTMS (initially formed by a merger of foremen and scientists' craft 
unions), and consciously adapted the union structure and character to 
the status consciousness and exclusivity of engineers.26 DATA, later 
TASS, modified its strategy through competition from other unions 
who emerged to recruit the newly "professionalized" engineers. 
From the late 1960s, "professionalization," however partial, offered 
other organizations an opportunity to move into the area via exclusive 
engineers' unions based on educational segmentation. It was the pro-
fessional engineering institutes and the Engineers' Guild which made 
the running for these new "qualified engineers." In 1969 the Engineers' 
Guild, with a scattered membership of 6,000, established the United 
Kingdom Association of Professional Engineers (UKAPE) as an exclu-
sive "professional engineers' union." Other "professional" unions 
appeared at the same time in an attempt to recruit engineering, science, 
and technology graduates in industry in opposition to established 
white-collar unions. 27 This first professional union strategy failed partly 
because of employers' opposition to the further proliferation of unions 
within an already overcrowded multi-union environment.28 But, equal-
ly important was the determined opposition to the unwelcome new-
comers of established technical unions such as TASS and ASTMS. Sig-
nificantly, the old unions could claim efficacy in collective bargaining, 
while calling on the political power of the TUC and wider union move-
ment to block any encroachment into their job territories by profes-
sional and anti-TUC, right-wing rivals. 29 
A second wave of professional engineering unionism occurred in the 
late 1970s, when a single-industry engineers' union, the EPEA, formed 
the Engineers and Managers Association (EMA) to recruit outside the 
power engineering industry. According to the official historian of the 
EPEA, the new union was a spontaneous response to demands by 
engineers for an EPEA-style union. 30 In reality, it was a response to 
declining membership of the EPEA in a contracting industry that 
forced the union to recruit further afield. They also capitalized on the 
failure of UKAPE to make any in-roads into recruiting engineers from 
scratch. The EMA was sponsored by the collective voice of the engi-
neering institutes, the Council of E11gineering Institutes, to. challenge 
the growth of TASS and ASTMS.31 Unlike·UKAPE, the EPEA had 
well-established trade-union roots, dating back to 1913, and repre-
sented a more serious challenge to established technical unions. 
The challenge was seen by some commentators, such as Roslender, as 
inaugurating a "new model unionism," combining an established trade 
union effectiveness with a strong orientation towards professionalism 
which would act like a magnet for graduate engineers, and a strategic 
model for other organizational professions such as accountants, per-
sonnel managers, systems analysts and marketing staff. 32 However, 
such a scenario has failed to materialize. The EMA was blocked from 
establishing a wider recruitment base due to established union opposi-
tion, a general decline in union growth from the late 1970s, and the 
non-viability of small unions within an increasingly concentrated Brit-
ish union environment. Employers were reluctant to grant recognition 
to another union when a strategy of reducing the number of bargaining 
units has been their aim for a number of years. The EMA continued to 
experience organic decline and picked up only four "transfers of en-
gagement" of engineers' and managers' staff associations between 1977 
and 1987. Less than 20 percent of its 41,000 paper membership were 
outside its original base in electricity supply. 33 It remains a small, exclu-
sive right-wing union within the TUC, which will only survive through 
merger, most likely to the equally right-wing EEPTU. 
The established home of engineers and managers staff associations 
outside technical unions is the right-wing EEPTU, which has the 
largest number of engineers of any manual union.34 It houses its staff 
associations in a separate section called the Electrical and Engineering 
Staff Associations (EESA). The EEPTU-EESA absorbed five engi-
neers, managers and foremen's staff associations between 1976 and 
1987, and four "professional unions" which appeared in the late 1960s, 
including ASEE, the Steel Industry Staff Association (SIMA), UKAPE 
and AMPS. All of these organizations were launched on the basis of 
"professional exclusiveness," hostile to white-collar-unions, let alone 
manual ones. That these supposedly professional unions should have 
ended up within a manual union underlines the fact that their concern 
with occupational exclusiveness existed alongside a right-wing political 
practice, and that the latter is probably a more significant determinant 
of union form and character in Britain. 
TASS became a technical white-collar umon with a sizable craft 
manual union base by absorbing craft unions in the 1980s. It changed 
again in 1988, when it merged with ASTMS, to form Manufacturing, 
Science and Finance (MSF), the biggest white-collar union in Europe, 
with a paper membership of 600,000 and a reach across the staff/ 
manual and industrial divides between manufacturing and service. 
ASTMS grew through merger and the absorption of sixteen staff asso-
ciations (which had flourished as alternatives to independent unions in 
the 1960s, but declined in the 1970s and 1980s). Although the two 
unions combine different traditions, they represent the single largest 
concentration of technical labor in Britain today. This is a "new wave 
unionism," conglomerate and big, within an increasingly concentrated 
union environment.35 
Engineers in Britain today, insofar as they have a choice of unions to 
join, are faced with the two political poles of the MSF and EEPTU, and 
the occupational exclusivity and right-wing character of the EMA. The 
project of occupational exclusivity as a basis for collective organization 
looks increasingly untenable, and it will be union size and politics, not 
occupation or status, that determine the pattern of union structure in 
the future. 
Thus, engineers in both Britain and the United States have demonstrat-
ed strong concerns with status. However, in the British case, estab-
lished technical unions were adept at accommodating these concerns 
by granting separate bargaining facilities, defending wage differentials, 
and the like, while at the same time blocking professional-only unions 
from either entering or expanding into their domain. British technical 
unions have found a variety of means of meeting the changing aspira-
tions of engineers while keeping them in membership of the wider 
union movement. Indeed, engineering unionism grew most rapidly in 
the aftermath of the recent shift towards credentialism and university 
training for engineers. In short, while the kinds of professional status 
concerns characteristic of a "new" profession have shaped the union 
movement in both cases, the British case indicates that the presence of 
such concerns alone is not inconsistent with unionism. If we are to 
explain the failure of American engineering unionism, therefore, the 
influence of professionalism must be examined in conjunction with the 
role played by other factors. 
Business professionalism 
Before turning to a consideration of these other factors, a second 
aspect of engineers' professional rhetoric and ideology should be 
noted. If engineering is a "new" profession, with a distinctive concern 
for status, and not autonomy, it is also a "business" profession. As has 
been noted by virtually all observers of the engineering profession, the 
category of engineers is enormously heterogeneous, containing practi-
tioners in significantly different social, indeed class positions. Thus, 
"engineer" can mean a relatively low-level technical worker performing 
largely routine work in testing. Or, it can mean the chief executive offi-
cer of a multi-national corporation whose career began in engineering. 
It is the presence of engineer-managers within the professional com-
munity that is of particular importance to the history of engineering 
professionalism and engineers' unionism, because they have been very 
influential within the national engineering associations of both the 
United States and Great Britain (which has helped fuel the argument 
that these associations are, in some ways, extensions of business rather 
than independent professional associations). To a great extent, it has 
been their brand of professionalism that has been the official ideology 
of the organized engineering profession. And, not surprisingly, their 
professionalism has often been particularly hostile to unions. 
We have already noted the reluctance of engineering associations in 
both the United States and Great Britain to advocate and implement 
traditional mechanisms of professional closure such as licensing and 
formal educational requirements for entering engineering practice. 
Whalley suggests that, in the British case, "engineers ... lack the power 
and will to support a credential-based exclusionary strategy." 36 But this 
is not due, as Whalley and others maintain, to the "inherently practical" 
nature of engineering, where "only so much can be learned in the class-
room."37 Law and medicine are equally practical, combining theoreti-
cal and craft elements. What sets engineering apart is the enormous 
influence of engineer-employers over the profession and its institutions. 
Strict rules limiting membership of the profession to those with formal 
educational credentials would have the effect of excluding some of 
these employers, a fact which has been a very important impediment to 
the development of such rules in the American case. Moreover, engi-
neering employers have often used their dominant position within engi-
neering associations to discourage the formation of inflexible restric-
tions, in the form of credentials, that would limit their flexibility in the 
use of technical labor.38 It should not surprise us that engineering 
employers have not favored the development of a strong, independent 
profession analogous to the medical profession, capable of restricting 
the supply of technical labor and of achieving significant control over 
its own labor. 
In short, the influence of engineering employers has been one factor 
underlying the engineering profession's lack of emphasis on closure 
and professional autonomy. Moreover, the professional ideology that 
has emerged within engineering, colored in various ways by these 
elites, has had a distinctively anti-union cast. It is possible to argue, in 
other words, that engineering-employers have attempted to present 
professionalism as an alternative to unionism, as inconsistent with 
union organization, as a means of trying to impede, or at least control, 
the emergence of engineers' unions. 
It has been the employer-influenced professional associations that have 
been active proponents of the view that professionalism and conven-
tional unionism are incompatible. In the British case, this is evident in 
the efforts by the engineering institutes to encourage the development 
of "separate" quasi-unions such as UKAPE which would not be linked 
to (and presumably strengthened by) other union organizations. In the 
United States, the national engineering associations have consistently 
opposed unionism. In the 1920s, they helped to undermine the emer-
gence of a quasi-engineers' union in the form of the American Associa-
tion of Engineers (AAE), arguing that it was not professionat.3 9 And, in 
the 1940s, they initially opposed the formation of engineers' unions 
outright. Once it became apparent that it would not be possible to 
avoid the inclusion of engineers in conventional unions, the engineer-
ing associations, most notably the ASCE, moved to advocating the 
development of separate bargaining units for professionals.40 Goldner 
and Ritti have argued that employers often encourage or even impose 
professional ideology among their engineering employees, because it 
serves as a form of social controlY The history of the relationship be-
tween employer-influenced professionalism and engineers' unions 
seems consistent with this view. And the existence of a conscious effort 
to counterpose professionalism and unionism by engineering-
employers has served to make their reconciliation more difficult and 
more complex. 
Yet, British unions successfully overcame this obstacle, while American 
unions did not. If we look back over this review of the influence of pro-
fessional concerns, ideas, and forms on engineers, we are thus left with 
the conclusion that American engineers were more likely to ''frame" 
their concern with occupational status within the employer-influenced 
rhetoric of business professionalism. In contrast, British engineers, 
while similarly preoccupied with status and exposed to business-pro-
fessional rhetoric, rejected the latter and framed their concerns within 
the rhetoric and organizational forms of unionism. In both cases, pro-
fessional rhetoric and ideology had an effect, but the outcomes were 
startlingly different. The question thus becomes why American and 
British engineers responded so differently to a rather similar set of 
"professional" concerns. 
The status of the engineer 
One of the major reasons for this different response is that engineers in 
Great Britain and engineers in the United States have been accorded 
different status by society as a whole and management in particular. It 
has been well-documented in a variety of contexts (ranging from social 
scientific research to government inquiries such as the Finniston 
Report) that the status of the engineer in Great Britain is lower than his 
her counterpart in other societies, including the United States.42 Where 
British engineers routinely complain of being treated like workers, 
American engineers, except in periods of salary compression and 
unemployment, seem relatively secure in their "middle class" status and 
are seen by both the public and managers as relatively high-status pro-
fessionals.43 
These differences in status reflect larger social attitudes towards tech-
nology and industry in Britain and the United States.44 American cul-
ture has long exhibited extremely positive attitudes towards technology 
and those individuals and groups who work with it. This positive eval-
uation of technical men and women is apparent in the widespread ide-
alization of mythical figures such as Benjamin Franklin or Thomas 
Edison, whose virtues consist in their having been "practical men" who 
invented valuable new technologies or discovered important scientific 
principles. Similarly, American culture is also characterized by a deep 
respect for the activities of the business man and woman. 45 Although 
there are complexities here (e.g., the strong antipathy to "bigness" in 
business), figures such as the early captains of industry (Carnegie, 
Rockefeller, et al.) or more recent examples of corporate "excellence" 
(Iacocca, Watson, etc.) are routinely lionized in the popular media. 
American engineers have benefitted from these positive evaluations of 
business and technology. Most obviously, since Americans tend to 
value technology, and since engineers are clearly linked to technology, 
there is a generally positive view of engineers in American society as 
valuable, useful employees. They also have gained a degree of status 
from their association with business. Early on, engineering was linked 
to entrepreneurial modes of business. Sons of prominent families 
(including Frederick Taylor, the father of scientific management) saw 
engineering as a dignified occupation because, although it might mean 
getting one's hands dirty, it involved the prospects of a career culminat-
ing in the proprietorship of a small machine shop.46 While the days of 
the entrepreneurial engineer did not survive long in the context of cor-
porate capitalism, the fact that respected middle-class families sent 
their sons into engineering lent the occupation a degree of status which 
carried over into the organizational age. More recently, engineers have 
been associated with many of the positive technical accomplishments 
of American business. Corporate slogans emphasizing "better living 
through better technology" or "chemistry" routinely present Americans 
with an image of the engineer as the fusion of the positive sides of both 
technology and business. While there have also been criticisms of en-
gineering activities, criticisms which have grown louder since the 1960s 
as a result of the growing doubt about the virtues of scientific "pro-
gress," engineers have occupied a relatively privileged place in the 
American view of things. 
One of the more important consequences of this positive cultural ste-
reotype of the engineer has been that American managers have tended 
to see engineers as an important type of employee. Since technology is 
seen as important to business success, and since engineers have long 
been regarded as "middle class" professionals, major employers have 
taken engineers seriously as prospective managers. Moreover, as David 
Noble has shown, American managers, because they regarded engi-
neers as important to business success and because they were aware of 
the need to recruit engineers into managerial roles, took an active part 
in shaping the curriculum of American engineering schools.47 By 
encouraging business courses and certain kinds of practical training in 
engineering programs, managers ensured that the schools would pro-
duce trustworthy engineering personnel who were socialized to the 
needs of the corporation and who would constitute a pool of potential 
managers. 
For all of these reasons, engineers in the United States have had a rela-
tively high status and relatively close ties to the managers who employ 
and supervise them. There can be no doubt that this has accentuated 
their tendency to question the relevance of unionism to their situation. 
By contrast, British engineers, handicapped by the stigma associated 
with working with one's hands, have occupied lower status. This dif-
ference is one of the factors helping to explain their greater willingness 
to adopt union forms of organization. 
As already mentioned, British engineers have historically entered the 
engineering profession through premium apprenticeships and pupilage 
to particular employers who have exercised a massive influence on the 
structuring of the engineering profession. Not only did such systems 
emphasize the importance of engineering as a "practical craft" and not 
a theoretical discipline, but the supply of engineers qualified through 
such routes was never sufficient to undermine the reliance on manual 
crafts. When technical education appeared in the nineteenth century to 
supplement craft practices, it was "defined so narrowly that the classes 
it sponsored for workers in fields such as engineering offered little 
competition to long established methods of craft-oriented training." 
While in the late nineteenth century American capital restructured 
engineering through the universities, in Britain, engineering courses 
were restricted to a few institutions, and did not in any way disrupt the 
apprenticeship system. Ahlstrom has noted the relative scarcity of engi-
neering courses in British universities in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, and the concentration of graduates within a limited 
number of industries - chiefly mining and brewing.48 A survey of grad-
uates from the main graduating institutions revealed, moreover, that 
only 20 percent of those with a technical degree actually entered Brit-
ish industry, and none of these in managerial positions. In other words, 
this limited supply was not met with open arms by industry. Part-time 
study and apprenticeships remained the dominant method of training 
engineers until the 1960s. This served to ensure that entry channels 
were not monopolized by the middle class, but open to workers. 
Indeed, engineering did not figure as an appropriate profession for the 
middle class, who preferred pure science and the arts to the applied 
disciplines.49 Recent studies of engineers in Britain confirm the con-
tinued importance of the craft tradition for socializing engineers into a 
practical orientation where theory, credentialism, and a strict separa-
tion between intellectual and manual labor are rejected in favor of flu-
idity between learning and doing.50 This is not inherent in engineering, 
but rather its peculiarly British structure. 
If we look at the growth of managerial hierarchies in Britain and the 
place of engineers in them, what is striking is that engineers fail to make 
top management positions. Armstrong has argued that managerial 
hierarchies in Britain are the domain of accountants and marketing 
specialists, two groups linked with unproductive labor. 51 This reflects 
the typically British disdain for trade, craft, or the practical among 
business elites. Unlike the German case, in Britain it has been "anti-
productivist ideologies" that have found most support. This thesis 
echoes the wide literature on "the peculiarities" of British capi-
talism.52 
Such cultural accounts of the differences between countries need to be 
engaged in cautiously, so as to avoid an oversimplified, blanket "so-
cietalism." For example, there is the danger of ignoring the sectors of 
British industry where engineers do dominate managerial hierarchies, 
such as chemicals, mining, public utilities, and construction. There is 
therefore a "sector" effect in operation, and this may reflect the lack of 
opportunities for marketing in these sectors or the fact that civil engi-
neers, unlike other engineering specialisms, have retained control over 
finance, whereas in general manufacturing, these functions have been 
removed from the engineers, who have become narrow technical spe-
cialists. Moreover, in these sectors, membership of engineering insti-
tutes is higher, and unionism of a strictly "exclusive" form. The larger 
technical unions are restricted in these sectors, except in the case of 
chemicals, where ASTMS has been traditionally strong. 
Nevertheless, allowing for such sector qualifications, it is true that 
"management" in Britain lacks a technical heart, and is rather about 
general decision-making. Moreover, as Lazonick has noted in com-
paring the growth of British and American managerial hierarchies, in 
Britain managers were recruited from the elite public schools and uni-
versities as "surrogate family members," and having a technical skill was 
not only unnecessary for selection, but probably a disadvantage.53 
Having the right background, not the right qualifications remained the 
most important factor in recruiting in senior management until the 
emergence of business education in the 1960s. 
The question posed by these historical legacies is why British engineers 
have not acted to change their status, increase their attractiveness to 
management, and in general counter all this bad press. Prescriptions 
for improving the health of the engineers litter the history of the profes-
sion over the last hundred years. These have focused on educational 
reforms, institutional rationalization, enhancing the technology con-
sciousness of the nation, state commissions into the supply, status, and 
training of technical manpower, trying to attract women into the pro-
fession, and trying to attract more school children into the profession. 
We cannot here examine these in detail; others have noted their short-
comings.54 What we can say is that institutional rationalization has 
failed to improve the public perception of the engineer: recruitment 
into engineering is declining; few of those who leave as graduate engi-
neers want to stay as engineers; a recent survey of engineering gradu-
ates revealed that "two out of three" had decided against a career in 
engineering;55 business education of engineers either reinforces desires 
to leave the profession or is seen as irrelevant to the practicing engi-
neer. Management persists in regarding engineers as specialist labor, 
and pay rates continue to be comparatively poor against other manage-
ment specialisms, such as marketing and accountancy. 
Engineers' status and the timing of unionization 
The different status of engineers in the two societies has had important 
consequences for the history of engineering unionism. In particular, it 
encouraged engineers to respond to the emergence of material con-
cerns in different ways. American engineers, with their closer ties to 
management and relatively high prestige, tended to look first to profes-
. sional associations to solve their material problems. Unionism was not 
something to which they were exposed during their period of profes-
sional training; and joining unions implied negating their ties to man-
agement and crossing a socially constructed class divide. In contrast, 
British engineers were socially defined as the "top" of manual labor. As 
a result, they had more direct experience of unionism and had fewer 
psychological obstacles to overcome. 
The initial organizational "choices" of British and American engineers, 
rooted in their different social status, tended to perpetuate themselves. 
In the British case, unionism among engineers emerged relatively early 
and established itself well before the solidification of a strong, gradu-
ate-based professional identity. By contrast, American engineers 
embarked quite early on a kind of "professional project"; despite its 
lack of success, engineering unions had to struggle to emerge after this 
direction was well-established. Thus, we need also to consider the 
question of timing, an issue which has generally been neglected in 
sociological discussions of professionalism and unionism. It clearly 
matters whether unionism or professionalizing forces emerged first. 
In the American case, like the British one, engineering associations 
have not defined themselves as defenders of engineers' material inter-
ests. On the contrary, they have resolutely resisted being drawn into 
this role, as we have seen. However, in periods of economic hardship 
among engineers, members of the profession have tended to look first 
to the professional associations for help. This pattern has been evident 
on several occasions in the history of American engineering in the 
twentieth century. Thus, in the period after World War I when engi-
neering employment slipped and engineering salaries were losing 
ground to those of manual workers, many engineers turned to their 
professional societies for assistance with their material problems. The 
societies were reluctant to become involved in such activities, which led 
to a significant amount of internal conflict and helped fuel what Edwin 
Layton has called "the revolt of the engineers." However, fearing the 
development of engineers' unionism, most of the professional associa-
tions responded with some concessions to dissidents within the soci-
eties and with a variety of half-measures such as employment services 
and talks and publications on finding a job.56 
A similar pattern emerged in the Great Depression. Like most Ameri-
cans, engineers were hard hit by the Depression. A federal government 
study of the engineering profession estimated that 34 percent of Amer-
ican engineers had experiened unemployment between 1929 and 1934 
and reported a 33 percent decline in median earnings during the same 
period.57 This stimulated calls for action on behalf of engineers; and, 
while there was some interest in unionization, most engineers looked 
first to their professional associations for help. While the associations 
shied away from anything that resembled collective bargaining, they 
did recognize the need to do something and responded, as in the earlier 
period, with employment services, employment advice, and the like. 
Once again, engineers turned to their professional associations as their 
first resort in a period of crisis. And, once again, the associations 
responded with half measures which seemed designed to discourage 
the development of more assertive forms of engineering organization. 
Finally, in the late 1960s, when cuts in the space program and the 
winding down of the Vietnam War led to a decline in engineering 
employment, engineers again turned to the professional associations 
for assistance. As in the previous crises, pressure was placed on the 
societies to do something about the plight of unemployed engineers; 
typically, the societies responded with employment advice and similar 
programs. And, as in earlier periods, the dissatisfaction with these rela-
tively weak measures produced heated debate within the professional 
societies. The debate focused on such questions as whether engineering 
societies could serve their members' professional interests if they were 
closely tied to employers and whether it was appropriate for such 
societies to confine their activities to what was possible within the con-
fines of self-defined "learned society." 58 
In summary, American professional engineers have consistently turned 
to their professional associations when a material crisis developed 
within the profession. This is in marked contrast to the British case, 
where, by and large, the societies have been seen as irrelevant to mate-
rial issues. At the heart of this tactical difference lies the different status 
of British engineers. Unlike their American counterparts, British engi-
neers were defined as part of manual labor and lacked close ties to 
management; the attractions of a self-evidently ineffective "profes-
sionalizing" strategy were, thus, diminished. Subsequent attempts to 
pursue a "professionalizing" strategy had to contend with the reality 
that unions for engineers already existed. 
Exclusive, university-based entry systems into engineering have been 
relatively slow to develop in Britain, which has been distinguished by 
the persistence of diverse, apprenticeship-based access routes. This 
reflects traditional training patterns in Britain and employers' hostility 
to purely academic training and their resistance to empowering engi-
m!ers with exclusive credentials. Graduate entrants into engineering 
accounted for 35 per cent of total engineers in 1945, but we see a pro-
gressive increase in the proportion in the post-war period, rising to 50 
percent in the mid-60s, and over 90 percent in the 1980s.59 By contrast 
to American engineers, graduate status as a boundary badge of profes-
sional identity is a relatively recent phenomenon. 
This difference meant barriers between professional associations and 
trade unions could not be built on an educational divide, and the 
apprenticeship system persistently exposed engineers to unionization. 
British engineering institutes have, as a consequence of this and the 
altogether more legitimate place of trade unions within the society, had 
to adopt a more flexible and strategic posture towards technical unions. 
British engineering institutions, like their American counterparts, see 
material issues as inappropriate concerns for professional organiza-
tions; indeed, many are restricted by Charter from engaging in activities 
to better the material conditions of engineers. For example, the charter 
of the Institute of Mechanical Engineers states: "the Institution shall 
not carry on any trade or business or engage in any transaction with a 
view to the pecuniary gain or profit of the members thereof." 60 They 
have therefore been vulnerable to competition from trade unions 
claiming to do just that, especially where employers are unwilling to 
accept as given established wage differentials, and therefore treat engi-
neers as skilled labor, rather than a class apart. One response to the 
restrictive economic function of the Institutions was the establishment 
of the Engineers' Guild in 1937 to promote the material interests of all 
engineers in corporate membership of the institutions. The Guild, in 
addition to promoting the public image and professional standing of 
engineers, advised individuals on terms of employment, pensions, sala-
ries, and status questions. It is significant that the Guild appeared at a 
time when unionization of technical labor was increasing. The Guild, 
however, was no answer to workplace union organization provided by 
the technical unions and central to the post-war British industrial rela-
tions environment. It struggled along with a scattered membership of 
around 5,000-6,000 until dissolving its membership into the UKAPE, 
an organization set up by the institutes in the late 1960s when technical 
trade unionism was again booming. Indicative of the failure of this 
strategy, apart from the low membership of the Guild, has been the 
support for particular trade unions by the engineering institutions to 
block challenges by less welcome trade unions. 
An early instance of this appeared when the Electricians' Trade Union 
began to bring within its membership engineers of all ranks in the 
power stations in 1917. The Institution of Electrical Engineers at-
tempted to form its own "exclusive" association to block this drive. 
However, this failed as a moderate "exclusive" union was already in 
competition with the ETU: the Electrical Power Engineers' Associa-
tion. The lEE sided with the EPEA, recommending power station 
engineers join this union to block the threat from the manual craft 
union.61 Another example is the setting-up of UKAPE by the Engi-
neers' Guild in 1969 to compete with established technical unions who 
were actively recruiting graduate engineers. This, as noted below, 
failed. In 1975, the Council of Engineering Associations, an organiza-
tion formed to promote the public interest of all engineering institutes, 
openly but reluctantly supported, for the first time, engineers joining 
trade unions. This was a strategic decision aimed at promoting a new, 
right-wing union, the Engineers' and Managers' Association, formed 
out of the EPEA to recruit engineers outside of the power industry.62 
The CEI recommended members join the EMA and three non-affili-
ated "professional unions" - UKAPE, the Association of Professional 
Scientists and Technologists (APST), and the Association of Superviso-
ry and Executive Engineers (ASEE). The large technical unions, where 
the majority of engineers are organized, TASS and ASTMS, were not 
recommended as "they were considered insufficiently professionally 
orientated and did not incorporate in their rules provision for a ballot 
before taking industrial action." 63 The voice of the professional asso-
ciations, as expressed through the CEI or the Engineering Council 
established in 1982, has continued to promote the EMA and what 
became the home of the failed professional unions in the 1980s, the 
Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbing Union -
Electrical and Engineering Staff Associations (EEPTU-EESA) against 
the larger technical unions.64 The British case therefore exhibits an 
opportunistic attitude of engineering institutes towards trade unions, 
and a keen political strategy of promoting right-wing organizations 
against what are perceived as large, left-wing unions. For comparative 
purposes, however, what is striking is the complete failure of the institu-
tions themselves to form the organizational arena within which engi-
neers' material grievances are satisfied. This has always taken place 
within a trade union form. 
Thus, the late emergence of engineering professionalism in Great 
Britain helped facilitate the growth of engineers' unions. By contrast, 
American engineers' unions had to contend with a well-established, 
deeply-entrenched professionalizing thrust. The different results of 
engineering professionalism in the two cases were, in other words, 
heavily influenced by the historical sequence of events. 
Unanswered questions 
The combination of status differences and the timing of events was a 
major factor shaping the history of engineering unionism in Great 
Britain and the United States. However, we reject the conclusion that 
this alone constitutes an explanation of the difference between the two 
cases. 
First, we must ask why British engineering unions did not atrophy as 
the status of engineers rose in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Although 
British engineers retain part of their traditional stigma as manual labor, 
they have moved considerably closer to the status occupied by Amer-
ican engineers as a result of new, university-based training programs. 
Yet, their unions did anything but shrink; indeed, engineering unionism 
grew most rapidly precisely in this period. Status alone, then, does not 
account for the different history of British engineering. 
Nor is it true that the early emergence of professionalizing tendencies 
inevitably blocks unionization. One can point to the experience of 
occupations where unionism did take hold in spite of existing profes-
sional movements (e.g., university teaching). Indeed, closer examina-
tion of the history of American engineering indicates that there have 
been strains of nominally "professional" ideology within the American 
engineering community, which has been more open to unions or union-
like organization. 
Thus, students of the rise and fall of engineers' unions in the 1940s and 
1950s found that rank-and-file engineers' professionalism was, in many 
ways, rhetorical and not incompatible with the principle of unionism as 
such. Research on American engineers' attitudes (as well as those of 
other organizational professionals) has shown that professional ideol-
ogy is not an inherent barrier to unionism.65 Professionalism may color 
the unions professionals create - giving them a distinctive preoccupa-
tion with issues such as salary differentials, merit pay and career struc-
tures.66 Our view of the specificity of professional engineers' unions is 
developed more fully in the concluding section of this article. But, the 
professionalism of th"e rank-and-file engineer is not the opposite of 
unionism. 
The case of the American Association of Engineers (AAE) illustrates 
well the relationship between engineering professionalism and union 
organization and the diversity of opinion within the engineering com-
munity.67 The AAE emerged at the end of World War I, in the context 
of heavy inflation, unemployment, and a decline in the earnings of engi-
neers relative to those of other industrial employees. Although it ex-
plicitly rejected the idea of unionism, its membership wanted the AAE 
to act like a union as well as a professional association. They clearly 
joined for "union" reasons: i.e., they hoped for collective action on the 
material questions, such as salaries and employment, of concern to 
engineers. It was the failure of the AAE's leadership to act more 
aggressively on the remuneration question that led to the AAE's de-
cline. Under pressure from the more resolutely anti-union profes-
sionalism of the national engineering associations, these engineering 
leaders backed off; the AAE's membership began to decline rapidly 
almost immediately. Significantly, many of the material concerns 
expressed by the rank-and-file engineers who joined the AAE con-
tinued to crop up in the unionization efforts of later decades. 
In summary, status differences and the timing of unionization efforts 
alone do not explain the different histories of engineering unionism in 
the United States and Great Britain. A fuller explanation must place 
these factors in the context of other factors external to the engineering 
profession itself. 
The labor movement and the engineer 
One historical factor conditioning the development of engineers' 
unions is the attitude of the labor movement towards engineers. The 
willingness of unions to attempt to recruit engineers as members, and 
the manner in which they approach engineering employees, has been a 
major factor affecting overall rates of engineering unionization. And, as 
a comparison shows, there are major differences between the British 
and American labor movements in their approach to professional engi-
neers. 
The major labor organizations in the United States have not demon-
strated a sustained interest in organizing professional employees in 
general and engineers in particular. Although there have been periodic 
attempts to establish relationships between the labor movement and 
professional engineers, these efforts have been sporadic at best and 
indicate clearly the labor movement's sense that professional engineers 
are.not their central constituency. In the 1920s, there were a few isolat-
ed attempts to establish engineers' unions linked to the American 
Federation of Labor; but, these were very few and far between and, 
more importantly, tended to be associations of lower-level technical 
workers such as draftsmen. Also in the 1920s, the American Federa-
tion of Labor entered into a curious kind of relationship with the Tay-
lor Society, forging a kind of alliance between industrial engineers 
influenced by scientific management and the labor movement.68 How-
ever, this was not a permanent link and, in any case, did not involve any 
attempts to invite engineers to join the labor movement. On the whole, 
the AF of L has been rather skeptical of professional engineers and 
other "middle-level" corporate employees as union members, fearing 
that they would become advocates of management within the labor 
movement.69 
The emergence of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 
the 1930s led to the most concerted effort to organize engineers. As 
part of the general upsurge in organizing activity in the late 1930s, 
some professional engineers were recruited into CIO affiliates. How-
ever, organizing engineers was never a high priority for union leaders in 
this period. Their focus was on organizing previously unorganized 
industries, such as automobiles, rubber and steel. If this meant that 
some engineers were organized as well, all the better. The CIO did 
create a separate white-collar union for the purposes of organizing 
white-collar employees of various kinds.7° Nevertheless, it is clear that 
few of the federation's resources were used specifically for the purpose 
of organizing such workers. It is thus hardly surprising that few engi-
neers joined. 
Since World War II, the leaders of the AFL-CIO have placed some-
what more emphasis on the white-collar sector. Particularly as the 
movement has stagnated and even contracted, there has been a growing 
recognition of the structural changes in the occupational and economic 
structure of the United States and the need to find ways to recruit new 
constituencies for organized labor. However, this has not translated 
into extensive organizing campaigns among white-collar and profes-
sional workers. The major exception is the public sector; in the 1960s 
major gains were made in organizing teachers, government employees, 
and other public-sector workers. Outside of the public sector, where 
organizing is considerably more difficult, there has been relatively little 
activity. Since professional engineers are primarily in the private sector, 
they have not been the object of much organizing activity. 
In part this reflects the continued identity of the labor movement with 
manual labor. Although there has been increased awareness of the 
need to include non-manual workers in organized labor, it remains the 
case that the unions perceive themselves and are perceived by others as 
primarily organizations of industrial workers. As a result, they have 
tended to place more emphasis on recruiting unorganized blue-collar 
workers (viz. Operation Dixie, the last major AFL-CIO organizing 
campaign) rather than middle-level white-collar employees such as 
engineers. They also have not made much effort to recruit and employ 
organizers with professional backgrounds. This has made it more diffi-
cult for them to succeed among professional constituencies, especially 
outside the public sector where organizing is more difficult and where 
the presence of blue-collar unions tends to link the union movement as 
a whole with manuallabor.71 
Most importantly, however, the AFL-CIO has been far less active since 
the late 1940s in organizing generally. As many observers have pointed 
out, organized labor has devoted relatively fewer resources to organiz-
ing activities in the last three or four decades. 72 Not surprisingly, the 
union movement has not grown very much in this period and has been 
relatively unsuccessful in recruiting new constituencies. Among the 
groups who have been "neglected" in this period of stagnation and con-
solidation by organized labor are the engineers. 
Not only have American unions been slow to attempt to organize engi-
neers, but their occasional efforts to do so have not, on the whole, 
taken forms likely to encourage such employees to join with the larger 
labor movement. As we saw earlier, American engineers have shown a 
certain interest in unions, often because they hoped to use unions as a 
mechanism to maintain their status and position with respect to other 
kinds of employees. As a result, they have tended to be more comfort-
able with separate unions for engineers and to have been somewhat 
uncomfortable with the more egalitarian tendencies within the Ameri-
can labor movement. From this point of view, the natural home for 
engineers' unions was probably the AF of L, with its craft unions and 
its history of political moderation. However, the AF of L was deeply 
suspicious of professional employees such as engineers and made few 
efforts to recruit them. 
The CIO, on the other hand, was more interested in white-collar and 
professional workers and made more concerted efforts to recruit them. 
However, for a variety of reasons, the CIO was not in the best position 
to appeal to professional engineers. Its leaders were aware of the pre-
ference of white-collar workers for separate unions, and they created a 
distinct white-collar union for this purpose: the United Office and Pro-
fessional Workers. 73 The fledgling Federation of Architects, Engineers 
and Chemists and Technicians, founded in 1933, merged with this 
union in the late 1930s. Yet, despite these concessions to the exclu-
sivism of engineers and other white-collar employees, the CIO was 
committed to the principle of industrial organizing, and many of its 
member unions attempted to include engineers in units dominated by 
blue-collar workers. For example, the International Association of 
Machinists conducted a major organizing campaign in the Seattle area 
in the mid-1940s that included professional engineers.74 What is more, 
the CIO was committed to a much more egalitarian social policy and 
was identified, with some justice, as being the most radical of the major 
union organizations in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s. 
In other words, it was the kind of union organization most likely to 
frighten engineers away, given their concern with privilege, exclusivism, 
and political moderation. 
The result was that engineers' unions were largely isolated from the 
major union federations when they began to appear in the 1940s and 
195Os. Indeed, many of them were formed as an attempt to avoid inclu-
sion in the CIO. The only engineers' unions that did join the CIO in the 
1940s tended to be politically on the left; significantly, the omnibus 
white-collar union of which these engineers' unions were part was ex-
pelled from the CIO in the late 1940s because of its links to the Ameri-
can Communist Party.75 The isolation of the engineers' unions from the 
major labor federations left them relatively weak and made it much 
more difficult to expand engineers' unionism beyond a certain point. 
Once the passage of Taft-Hartley had removed the need for defensive 
unions, and once the existing unions had begun to define themselves as 
something more than defenses against industrial unionism, the question 
of affiliation to the labor movement was raised once again. Some engi-
neers' unions, still apprehensive about the earlier experience with the 
CIO, elected to remain independents. But others, desiring to make use 
of the greater resources and bargaining power of the national federa-
tions, eventually did affiliate with the AFL-CIO. However, this oc-
curred in the mid-1950s, once the overall labor movement had stopped 
growing and once the organizing drives of the 1930s and 1940s were 
over. The unions were no longer organizing the unorganized in earnest, 
especially not groups who appeared to them to be at the fringes of the 
labor movement as a whole. 
In summary, the American labor movement has not aggressively pur-
sued professional engineers or has done so in such a way as to frighten 
away potential engineering members. The most concerted effort to 
organize engineers, that by the CIO in the 1930s and 1940s, was not a 
high priority and, in any case, was tarnished as far as many engineers 
were concerned by the CIO's radicalism and industrial unionism. The 
result was that engineers' unionism remained weak and relatively iso-
lated; when some of these unions eventually did affiliate with the AFL-
CIO, they did so after the movement had passed into a period of con-
solidation and stagnation and was no longer engaged in large-scale 
organizing activities. 
By contrast, British unions have been much more flexible, and much 
more serious, in their pursuit of engineering members. As a result, they 
have been remarkably successful in organizing professional engineers. It 
is not that British workers have been less hostile to white-collar labor; 
they share with their American counterparts the same prejudices against 
the "pencil-pushers," the "office," the "staff," and those in what they per-
ceive as parasitic, "unproductive" positions in the labor process. How-
ever, such prejudices have not translated into organizational hostility, 
and white-collar unions have been encouraged and welcomed by blue-
collar organizations. White-collar workers have had to organize them-
selves into trade unions and earn a right to enter the labor movement 
by showing that they are prepared to mobilize the full repertoire of 
industrial sanctions against an employer and demonstrate external af-
filiations to the wider trade union movement, chiefly the TUC. Unions 
of clerks, foremen and technical staff all appeared in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Such unions flourished in a climate fa-
vorable to organization, and where the TUC was a legitimate player on 
the national political stage. The histories of white-collar unions, for 
example draftsmen or electricity supply engineers, indicates the impor-
tance of obtaining support from the manual unions, and affiliating to 
the wider labor movement. 76 Bain shows that all the major white-collar 
unions in the private sector affiliated to the TUC soon after their for-
mation, without this affecting their recruitment. 77The TUC was not 
hostile to white-collar unions, but it made no concessions to their affil-
iation. 
Unionization among technical labor followed a well-trodden craft 
route. Such forms of unionism exhibit similar patterns of exclusivity, 
labor market control, and occupational maintenance as demonstrated 
by professional associations. Engineers have been recruited by such 
unions expanding membership upwards within job ladders more 
steeped in a craft ethos and less educationally fractured compared to 
the U.S. Union growth in the 1960s moved beyond craft towards a 
broader white-collar constituency, with technical unions such as TASS 
and ASTMS growing rapidly. Rival professional unions founded on 
exclusive lines failed, despite a more conservative image, because they 
were ineffectual and lacked wider political power within the bargaining 
arena. 
What is critical to the emergence and durability of white-collar unions 
in Britain is the fact that the multi-union environment allowed and even 
encouraged the formation of separate unions. Exclusivity has remained 
an important requirement for white-collar workers. The gradual con-
centration of British unions in this century has allowed white-collar 
membership to grow both organically and through mergers, in a volun-
tary fashion. The TUC is now dominated by white-collar unions, and 
recent mergers have, as mentioned above, created conglomerate unions 
of mixed manual/non-manual memberships which nevertheless retain 
considerable inherited sectional autonomy. 
The climate for union organization 
It should also be emphasized that the overall climate for unionization 
has had a significant effect on engineers' unionism. The United States is 
one of the most hostile environments for union organizing in the indus-
trialized world; as a result, the American labor movement, especially 
since the 1940s, has experienced a long and much-publicized period of 
stagnation and even decline that has made it one of the weakest labor 
movements in the major industrialized countries. Michael Goldfield, in 
his recent work on the decline of organized labor in the United States, 
characterizes this as an historic "defeat" of labor, with the balance of 
class power shifting towards employers. Labor's weakness is linked to 
and exacerbated by its political isolation, regional isolation, and perva-
sive corruption.78 
The reasons for this weakness are not difficult to identify. Although 
much emphasis has been placed on structural shifts in the economy 
and occupational structure of the United States, it is now widely ac-
cepted that this, in itself, is not a barrier to the continued growth of 
unionism (as cases such as Canada, Sweden, and Great Britain clearly 
indicate).79 Rather, the roots of labor's decline lie in the legal-political 
context for unionization, the attitude of employers to unions, and the 
resulting lack of new organizing activities by the labor movement itself. 
American labor law is extremely restrictive and makes organizing very 
difficult. With the possible exception of the Wagner Act, most recent 
labor legislation has had the effect of placing various limits and restric-
tions on labor's ability to organize unorganized constituencies. To a 
great extent, this has "forced" the labor movement into a defensive pos-
ture, characterized by "fence-mending" and a relative neglect of organ-
izing activities. 80 At the same time, American employers have been 
notoriously hostile to unions. There is evidence, moreover, that this 
hostility has become more pronounced and aggressive since the pas-
sage of the Taft-Hartley Act, with employers growing more willing to 
employ and more skilled at using a variety of legal and illegal measures 
to block unionization and encourage the decertification of existing 
unions.81 Perhaps for this reason, the only real organizing successes of 
American labor since the early 1950s have been in the public sector, 
where the kind of virulent anti-union sentiment one finds among pri-
vate sector employers has been less pervasive.82 
The fact that it is very difficult to organize new constituencies in the 
United States and that American labor is very weak and on the defen-
sive is related in important ways to the failure of engineers' unionism. 
One of the most consistent findings in comparative research on white-
collar and professional unionism is that there is a much greater likeli-
hood that white-collar workers will join unions if the union movement 
as a whole is large and strong.83 In this sense, the weakness of engi-
neers' unionism is a symptom of the overall weakness of unionism in 
the United States. Moreover, research on engineers' attitudes to unions 
indicate that one of the central reasons for their opposition is their per-
ception that unions are not very effective, are weak, and are corrupt.84 
Given this, and given the evidence that engineers' unions were not, in 
fact, particularly effective in improving the situation of their members, 
it is not surprising that American engineers have failed to be attracted 
to the ranks of organized labor. 85 
British employers reached a historic compromise with labor unions by 
the 1880s. As a recent historian of British industrial relations has 
noted: 
By the 1880s it was possible to discern the emergence of a "system" of 
organised industrial relations in Britain, based on autonomous sectional 
collective bargaining based on representative associations of employers and 
workers. Authoritative declarations by ministers had made clear that this was 
the preferred method in which they had no intention of interfering. The 
state's professed role was to "hold the ring," maintaining what was asserted to 
be legal even-handedness between the contenders and intervening only to 
uphold law and order. For the employer the system required the recognition 
of the relevant trade union, acceptance of its representative character, prag-
matic acknowledgement that his workers were conscious of grievances and 
claims of their own defining, and readiness to negotiate through mutually 
agreed procedures. For the union it required the observance of the basic 
laws, principles and conventions governing ownership, status and reward, 
and an eschewing ofthe "political" strike ... H6 
While we can point to breaks and transitions in this accommodation 
among state, labor and capital, British unions have never faced whole-
sale reconstruction, such as Japanese, Italian or German unions, but 
have rather enjoyed the most stable political environment of any work-
ing class. Evolution, not revolution or radical reform has marked the 
history of the British union environment. Such stability, legitimacy and 
integration into civil society and the state cannot be said to have figured 
in American labor history. For white-collar unions, emerging into this 
environment, trade unions were a part of the body politic, part of the 
British way of life. 
The "voluntary" tradition has kept the state at arms' length from 
industrial relations. This does not mean that legal restraints on trade 
unions have not been applied by a class-conscious judiciary at 
moments of strategic class conflict. But, such judicial creativity has 
been of a temporary nature. The major restrictions on British unions 
have occurred in the last decade under a Conservative government 
which has broken the post-war consensus among state, labor and 
capital, and legally weakened the bargaining power of unions. However, 
the Labor Party already pledged to repeal the more restrictive elements 
of this legislation, thus following the pattern of repeal long established 
in the British political climate. And, even the Tories under the most 
class-conscious post-war government have not smashed the unions or 
gone for a full deunionization strategy. They have simply made the legal 
environment more hostile, and kept up an ideological attack on 
"militant" unionism. Union density has remained high and there has 
been no attempt to introduce "right to work" American-style legis-
lation or statutory controls on the formation and spread of trade 
unions. The disjunctures in the two union environments have been 
noted in a recent book: 
The trajectory of American trade unionism is almost unparalleled in the 
advanced capitalist world, and only Japanese unions have managed to de-
cline as consistently and for as long as the Americans ... The violent hostility 
of American employers to trade unions has few parallels in Britain, and the 
US legal regime is markedly more hostile to unions and union recognition 
than in Britain. Finally, it remains the case that British (and most European) 
workers can reasonably expect to elect a pro-labour government at some 
time in their lives, whereas American workers have proved unable to sustain 
an independent workers' party that could challenge the two bourgeois par-
ties. H? 
Conclusion 
What conclusions can be drawn from the preceding comparison of 
British and American engineers' unionism? First, and most important, 
our comparative analysis supports a "structural contingency" theory of 
union formation. 
The simple argument that engineers are professionals and therefore are 
unlikely to unionize will not hold. As we have seen, neither British nor 
American engineers fit the "medical model" of professionalism. Both 
are "new" professions, in which the central reality is organizational 
employment. The structural necessity to negotiate the terms and condi-
tions of labor with employers thus confronts the engineer. While this 
does not make unions necessary or inevitable, it is this fact that plants 
the seed of unionism. Professional rhetoric and forms may exercise an 
influence over engineers' approach to unions, but they do not consti-
tute a viable alternative to unionism; they cannot erase the realities of 
organizational employment, nor have they alone been responsible for 
the relative failure of engineering unions in the United States. 
The pressures towards engineering unionism express themselves in 
specific national contexts and are strongly influenced by a variety of 
historical contingencies and cultural differences. Indeed, as we have 
argued, it is these contingencies that determine the precise ways and 
degree to which professionalism shapes the engineering community. 
We have emphasized a number of contingencies which have been 
important to the different histories of engineering unionism in Great 
Britain and the United States. 
First, we have pointed to the importance of status. In the United States, 
engineers' higher status and closer ties to management have created 
obstacles to unionization and have helped buttress the claims of "busi-
ness professional" ideology regarding the inappropriateness of unions. 
British engineers, in contrast, were defined as part of manual labor and 
tended to have early contact with unionism through their apprentice-
ship and early careers. The result was a much friendlier environment 
for the formation of engineering unions. We also have pointed to the 
question of timing - does engineers' unionism begin to take root before 
or after the emergence of strong professional patterns of recruitment 
and organization? While such patterns of recruitment and organization 
do not prevent unionization entirely, their existence clearly makes it 
somewhat more difficult. 
The history of engineering unionism has also been shaped by factors 
external to the engineering profession, particularly by the labor move-
ment as a whole. The approach of the union movement towards engi-
neers is important. Where, as in the British case, unions developed a 
strong commitment to organizing white-collar constituencies, and 
where unions were flexible enough to accommodate the peculiar needs 
of professional employees, unions developed more easily. In the Amer-
ican case, the relative lack of organizing activities directed at profes-
sionals and other white-collar groups and the skepticism regarding 
their appropriateness as union members helped to impede the develop-
ment of engineers' unions. The politics of the labor movement also 
played a role; the fact that it was the more militant, egalitarian CIO that 
approached American engineers had a distinct chilling effect on 
attempts to organize these relatively conservative employees. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, the overall climate for organization has 
had profound effects on the fate of union organization. In the United 
States, where there is a strongly anti-union culture, militantly anti-
union managers, and a restrictive legal framework for union organiza-
tion, the labor movement has been placed on the defensive. The failure 
to organize engineers in the United States is, in part, a symptom of the 
weakness and lack of organizing activities by American labor. By con-
trast, British unions, while hardly popular with employers, have faced 
less resolute opposition and have not had to contend with complex 
statutory restrictions. They have, as a result, been seen as more legit-
imate and effective, and have had much greater success in extending 
union organization beyond the ranks of manual labor. 
These conclusions regarding the importance of historical and national 
peculiarities for the emergence of engineers' unionism are broadly con-
sistent with Bain's classic analysis of the development of white-collar 
trade unions. 88 Bain argues that it is precisely historical factors, and in 
particular the attitude of government and employers towards unioniz-
ing activities, that determines whether white-collar unions will succeed 
in developing and growing. 
While we agree, up to a point, with Bain's analysis, we reject the view 
that engineers' unionism is purely a matter of historical contingency. 
On the contrary, we share Carter's critique of Bain - there are impor-
tant structural factors that also condition the emergence of engineers' 
unionism.89 Two, in particular, are worthy of emphasis here. First, to 
repeat, our analysis suggests that there is an underlying reality in the 
conditions of engineering employment creating tendencies toward 
unionization. Professional engineers are employees, and, as such, share 
the kinds of experiences that promote unionism - conflicts over wages, 
bureaucratic conditions of employment, job insecurity, and the like. 
These conditions do not automatically produce unionization; but they 
do place unionism on the agenda. There is a persistent question built 
into the engineers' situation- shall we unionize?- which does not go 
away even when, as in the United States, historical and national condi-
tions are not conducive to union formation. Second, Carter is right to 
stress that the emergence of what he calls "middle class" unionism 
depends on the structural realities of class conflict. Where class conflict 
becomes more intense, and the lines of conflict are more sharply 
drawn, the pressure on employees to unionize grows more pronounced. 
If we think back over the various periods in which engineers have 
attempted to organize, or have succeeded in doing so, it has tended to 
be periods in which levels of class conflict in society as a whole were 
relatively high. Moreover, as Carter points out, the historical factors 
emphasized by Bain depend, to some extent, on levels of class conflict. 
Why does the state become more favorable to union organization in 
certain periods? Clearly it is related to the pressures put on the govern-
ment by employees and their organizations to create more favorable 
conditions. The failure of engineers' unionism in the post-war United 
States, and its concomitant success in Britain, are clearly related to the 
strong position of British labor and the weakness of its American coun-
terpart. 
In summary, 1t 1s our contention that the emergence of unionism 
depends on the interaction between the structural forces that promote 
engineers' unionism and specific national and historical factors that 
either assist or impede it. This has important implications for the labor 
movement, in a period when unions generally have found that the 
ground is shifting beneath them and when the American labor move-
ment in particular is on the verge of being pronounced dead. 
Specifically, our analysis points to the fact that the union movement can 
incorporate non-traditional, ostensibly "middle class" employees such 
as professional engineers. First, we have argued that there exist in all 
industrial capitalist societies structural pressures towards unionization 
among such employees. Moreover, it is also true that the attitude of the 
labor movement, and the tactics it employs, do have an effect on the 
success or failure of the unionization project. In other words, if the 
labor movement approaches professional engineers on the basis of a 
real understanding of their needs and attitudes (as seems to have been 
the case in Great Britain), the chances for successful unionization are 
there. This is not to say that it is only a matter of the labor movement 
"waking up" and organizing engineers. On the contrary, conditions do 
vary from one country to the next, making the task of organizing more 
difficult in some cases. In the United States, the greater social status of 
engineers and the existence of a strong, cohesive anti-union strategy 
among managers are among the many factors that will continue to 
impede British-style engineers' unions. Nevertheless, our analysis does 
pose a challenge to those observers of the labor movement who con-
tend that changes in the make-up of the labor force (particularly the 
shift towards professional and service labor) have made unions obso-
lete. It may be difficult to organize professional workers, as, indeed, it is 
to organize any workers, but there is no reason to believe that they can-
not become part of the labor movement. 
Of course, the formation of engineering unions does not, in itself, make 
engineers an unambiguous part of the labor movement. Students of 
"middle class" unions in general, and engineers' unions in particular, 
have argued that such unions are "different," that they tend to define 
their interests as different from those of manual laborers and to prefer 
exclusivism to inclusion in blue-collar unions. 90 There can be no 
denying the exclusivism of engineers' unions. In both the United States 
and Great Britain, they have exhibited a strong preference for separate 
organizations, as well as a preoccupation with salary differentials, and a 
relative political conservatism. Indeed, we have argued that one of the 
keys to the success of British engineers' unionism was the early emer-
gence of "craft" models of unionization among engineers and the abili-
ty and willingness of general unions to accommodate this kind of exclu-
sivism even when engineers' unions were incorporated into larger labor 
organizations. 
Whether this represents a distinctively middle-class style of unionism is 
questionable, however. Although Carter tends to argue that it does, he 
also concedes that not all unions of manual workers are militant, egali-
tarian, or politically left-wing.91 There is a strong resemblance between 
engineers' unionism and traditional conservative craft unionism. This 
should be apparent from the British engineers' attraction to this kind of 
craft union and from the fact that, in the case of the United States, it 
was the CIO, not the AFL, that was most frightening to professional 
engineers. 
Moreover, the dynamics of unionization, and the historical evolution of 
trade unionism as a whole, have created pressures that tend to erode 
the exclusivist stance of white-collar unions. As Sturmthal has noted, 
once white-collar unions develop, even if they initially emerge as "sepa-
ratist" organizations, it is surprisingly easy to develop cooperative rela-
tionships between them and conventional manual unions. 92 Some of 
the remaining American engineering locals have affiliated with the 
AFL-CIO, as have teachers' unions and other organizations of white-
collar employees. Perhaps more importantly, recent events in Britain 
demonstrate a decline in the viability of the exclusivist project and the 
corresponding fusion of white-collar and blue-collar units in con-
glomerate unions. Political divisions still remain, but the apparent 
structural difference between white-collar unions and other unions has 
clearly diminished. 93 
It would be naive to suggest that all of the differences between engi-
neering unions and blue-collar unions are likely to disappear in the 
near future. Nor can we point to evidence that American engineers are 
about to emulate their British counterparts by joining the union move-
ment. What we can say, however, is that the failure of American engi-
neers to join unions is the result of historical, not structural factors. Our 
comparison of the British and American cases suggests that, while 
engineers are not "just like" other workers, there exist structural pres-
sures towards the unionization of professional engineers in all indus-
trial capitalist societies. As the labor force in industrial capitalist socie-
ties shifts further towards professional and service employees, the fate 
of the labor movement may depend on its ability to make the most of 
the opportunities for organizing these new constituencies. 
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